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PROPERTY AND MORTGAGE FRAUD UNDER THE 
MANDATORY VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT: WHAT IS 
STOLEN AND WHEN IS IT RETURNED? 
ABSTRACT 
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals are split on how to calculate 
restitution in a criminal loan fraud situation where collateral is involved. 
This trend is best illustrated in cases involving mortgage fraud. The split 
stems from disagreement over how to account for the lender’s receipt of 
collateral property. The Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals consider the property returned when the person defrauded receives 
cash from the sale of collateral property. The Second, Fifth, and Ninth 
Circuits deem the property returned when the lender takes ownership of the 
collateral property. This Note argues that the former conception of the off-
set value ought to govern. This Note also supports a view of property that 
considers the lender’s lost opportunity from fraud. Even when restitution 
is mandatory, the governing rule should take into account the alternative 
investment the lender would have made if there had been no fraud. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. housing and financial industries have been at the forefront of 
national attention since the dramatic and economically crippling events of 
2008.1 Six years later there is still much left to discuss and discover. In the 
wake of the collapse of the U.S. housing market, the intense press cover-
age of mortgage fraud might make it seem like a recently discovered fad.2 
However, the temptation to fool a bank has probably long existed: say the 
right words in the right way and walk away with a pile of money as a loan 
from a bank. Over five hundred years ago Niccolo Machiavelli dedicated 
The Prince to a scion of one of the world’s greatest financial institutions in 
history, Lorenzo de’ Medici.3 Machiavelli argued that cunning and deceit 
were required to succeed in life, and that “it is necessary ... to be a great pre-
tender and dissembler. Men are so simple-minded and so controlled by their 
immediate needs that he who deceives will always find someone who will let 
himself be deceived.”4 Machiavelli’s statements on the powers of duplicity 
likely would not have been news to a man who was both a politician and 
member of a banking family; politicians thrive on perception and banks 
practically breathe on truth and trust. 
Banks historically have gone to great lengths to avoid suffering from 
deception. The Medici Bank, like all others, would not have existed very 
long had it been deceived regularly. Indeed, fraud was a major source of the 
Medici Bank’s ultimate demise.5 Today, a misrepresentation to a bank pre-
sents the same bargain as it always has: cash for relatively minimal work at 
the price of dishonesty and the risk of getting caught. However, now, the 
necessary deception comes in different forms with more evocative monikers: 
                                                                                                                         
1 See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW 
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM 
CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES (2009); Sue Kirchhoff, Greenspan Takes One on the Chin, 
Admits Flaws in System, USA TODAY (Oct. 24, 2008, 2:05 AM), http://usatoday30.usa 
today.com/money/economy/2008-10-23-greenspan-congress_N.htm (quoting a statement 
of Alan Greenspan to Congress) (“A critical pillar to market competition and free markets 
did break down.... I still do not fully understand why it happened.”); Micha el Lewis, The 
End, PORTFOLIO MAGAZINE (Nov. 11, 2008), available at http://www.er.ethz.ch/inspire/end; 
This American Life: The Giant Pool of Money, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (May 9, 2008), 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/355/the-giant-pool-of-money. 
2 See Joe Nocera, The Mortgage Fraud Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2012, at A21; Joe 
Nocera, In Prison For Taking A Liar Loan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at B1. 
3 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 5 (Peter Bondanella trans. & ed., Oxford 
World’s Classics 2005) (1532). 
4 Id. at 61. 
5 E.g., NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY 47 (2008) (explaining that fraud was 
a major cause of the Medici Bank’s undoing). 
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strawbuyers, phantom sales, property flip fraud, double skimming, equity 
skimming, etc. 
How should we deal with someone who intentionally misleads a bank 
into making him/her a loan? Should we care whether there was any intent 
to repay the loan? Should we only focus on punishment or should we keep 
an eye towards helping the defrauded victim? If so, how should we account 
for property posted as collateral that is subsequently taken by the lender? 
When property was posted as collateral in consideration for the loan, how 
should that offset the obligations of the criminal? The Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act (MVRA)6 addresses these issues in federal court. 
This Note attempts to explain why stolen property returned under the 
MVRA should be valued for restitutionary damage purposes when the sub-
sequent foreclosure sale by the bank occurs, and not when title passes to 
the bank as is done in some circuits. This former approach has recently been 
persuasively adopted by the Seventh Circuit in the case United States v. 
Robers.7 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari and will hear arguments 
late February 2014. This Note argues that the law should punish fraud more 
harshly by adopting a broader conception of what is stolen by the fraud. 
Courts should recognize that mortgage fraud causes legitimate investment 
opportunities to go unfunded. As such, the definition of property stolen 
should include the investment opportunities that were forgone because of 
the fraud. This view of property does not allow any guidance from consider-
ing what would occur in a civil action, as some courts suggest doing. This 
view also presents potential problems with the MVRA’s bar on damages 
that are speculative or consequential. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Mortgages 
The banking industry can be a place rife with the allure of opportunity to 
profit from deception. This is the same reason that the famous thief Willie 
Sutton is mythologized to have responded when asked, “why he robbed 
banks: ‘Because that’s where the money is.’”8 The allure of theft exists 
from both outside and within banks. The Savings and Loan Crisis in the 
1980s shows fraud and illegality can be perpetrated within the bank.9 The 
                                                                                                                         
6 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 201, 110 Stat. 
1214, 1227 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012)). 
7 See United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (cert. granted, 
arguments and decision pending).  
8 Robert Polito, Gentleman Outlaw, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2012, at BR18. 
9 See generally WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: 
HOW CORPORATE EXECUTIVES AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY (2005). 
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crisis was marked by “many notorious examples of how [the] system was 
abused by unscrupulous S&L owners reporting high current income on ADC 
loans while milking the institution of cash in the form of dividends, high 
salaries, and other benefits.”10 
A major part of the banking industry, and indeed the American economy, 
is centered on mortgages, accounting for a total of $13.2 trillion in outstand-
ing loans as of the second quarter of 2012.11 For comparison, the Gross 
Domestic Product of the United States is in the area of $16 trillion.12 
The idea of a mortgage is simple and ancient,13 found in every system of 
law that we know.14 A mortgage is a security interest in property.15 The se-
curity interest gives the lender comfort that if the loan is not repaid, there 
is at least real property as collateral.16 This simple arrangement can become 
clouded through contracts so complicated that even renowned judges have 
given up reading them; however, that aspect is nothing new either.17 Long 
ago, a mortgage, or “dead pledge,” described a loan where the lender received 
payments, but did not apply those payments to reduce debt on the property, 
instead keeping them as profit.18 Those types of loans were considered 
usurious, and though not illegal, were viewed “as unjust and dishonest” thus 
nullifying the pledge.19 
Although the traditional mortgage arrangement has a long tradition, 
mortgages play a relatively new and critical role in today’s economy.20 Also, 
                                                                                                                         
10 1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., The Savings and Loan Crisis and Its Relationship to 
Banking, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 167, 184 (1997), http:// 
www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf. 
11 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDING 
(June 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand 
/mortoutstand20130630.htm. 
12 THE WORLD BANK, GDP (CURRENT US $), available at http://data.worldbank .org 
/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2011+wbapi_data_value+wbapi 
_data_value-last&sort=desc (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
13 See H.W. Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1890). 
14 Id.  
15 See id.  
16 See id. at 1–2. 
17 See id. at 2. (“[I]n our form of giving security on real estate to secure a common 
debt, or otherwise to provide assurance, we find a contract so artificial and so difficult of 
apprehension as to elude definition.”). See also David Lat, Do Lawyers Actually Read 
Boilerplate Contracts? Richard Posner and Evan Chesler Don’t; Do You?, ABOVE THE LAW 
(June 22, 2010, 2:42 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/do-lawyers-actaully-read 
-boilerplate-contracts-judge-richard-posner-doesnt-do-you/ (reporting that Judge Posner 
simply signed his home equity loan without reading it). 
18 Chaplin, supra note 13, at 8. 
19 Id. 
20 See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS HAPPENED AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1 (2008). 
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the process of both obtaining and granting a mortgage is very different. 
Banks used to make individual decisions on mortgages directly and held the 
mortgage for the duration of the loan.21 The process was much more inti-
mate than we see today. 
Today, from the consumer perspective, the process usually begins with 
an entity known as a mortgage originator.22 Mortgage originators play a vital 
role. A mortgage originator is the term given to the institution initially ap-
proving and making a loan.23 The loan, or the right to receive payments, is 
then sold to another institution.24 Sometimes the originators are banks, and 
other times they are mortgage specialists,25 who only originate mortgages 
and process payments. 
The process of obtaining a mortgage has become more impersonal and 
data-driven over the decades.26 Mortgages are evaluated and rated by easily 
measured criteria and metrics.27 No evaluation or weight is given to the pos-
sibility that someone may just seem subjectively untrustworthy, as could have 
happened in the past.28 The resulting rating assigned to a mortgage applica-
tion corresponds to the likelihood of the loan not being repaid, also known 
as default, given the applicant’s income, credit history, etc.29  
The mortgage-writing business runs on narrow profit margins and high 
volume. For efficiency’s sake the quality classification system uses a 
few easily measured criteria. How much does the applicant make com-
pared to his mortgage payment? How much is the mortgage compared 
to the assessed value of the home? How big is the down payment? What 
is the borrower’s credit score, etc.?30 
This evaluation process “leave[s] out a lot of detail,”31 but has the bene-
fit of simplicity and control. The mortgage originators are very focused on 
“the numbers” and are “perfectly aware that any given borrower who shows 
up as a low risk ‘by the numbers’ may turn out to be a very bad risk because 
of misfortune or even dishonesty.”32 A former Bear Stearns executive stated, 
                                                                                                                         
21 See ANDREW REDLEAF & RICHARD VIGILANTE, PANIC: THE BETRAYAL OF CAPITALISM 
BY WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON 13 (2010). 
22 See id. at 12. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 13. 
25 Id. at 12. 
26 See id. at 12–13. 
27 Id. at 12. 
28 See id. at 12–13. 
29 Id. at 12. 
30 Id.  
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 12–13; see James Charles Smith, The Structural Causes of Mortgage Fraud, 
60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 473, 477 (2010). 
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“We as an industry cannot eliminate fraud entirely .... We can and do con-
tinue to develop systems and detection techniques that evolve with the 
complexity of criminal schemes.”33 
Once an originator makes the loan, the loan is often sold into a larger 
assemblage of mortgages.34 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, quasi-government 
entities, have been the largest players in this resale market for a long time, 
buying up wide swaths of mortgage pools that originated elsewhere.35 “For 
all practical purposes, the mortgage originators ... were sales offices for 
Fannie, Freddie and the big banks.”36 Once sold into large, diversified pools, 
the mortgages as a whole should “benefit [from] the law of large numbers.”37 
Mortgage fraud, therefore, is generally perpetrated by misrepresenting some 
of those easily measured characteristics of a loan.38 
B. Mortgage Fraud 
Essentially, mortgage fraud is lying to the bank to get money, or, as 
some have called it, “bank robbery without a gun.”39 The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) defines mortgage fraud as a “material misstatement, mis-
representation, or omission relied on by an underwriter or lender to fund, 
purchase, or insure a loan.”40 Loan origination fraud is by far the most 
common type of mortgage fraud that the FBI encounters.41 Obtaining a loan 
through misrepresentation harms the value of the loan from the instant the 
loan is approved.42 Regardless of whether actual default occurs, the risk of 
the loan being in default (based on those easy-to-measure metrics) does not 
comport with its value because the loan is based on lies. 
                                                                                                                         
33 Michael Corkery, Fraud Seen as a Driver in Wave of Foreclosures, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 21, 2007, at A1. 
34 REDLEAF, supra note 21, at 13. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 14. 
38 See id. at 12; Smith, supra note 32, at 477.  
39 Ann Fulmer, Burning Down the House: Mortgage Fraud and the Destruction of 
Residential Neighborhoods 1 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Working Paper, 2010), http:// 
permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps123353/229912.pdf. 
40 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2010 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT YEAR IN REVIEW, 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud-2010 (last vis-
ited Jan. 12, 2014) [hereinafter MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT]. 
41 Id. (showing that among the nine schemes the FBI identifies, loan origination 
accounted for sixty-two percent of FBI cases concerning mortgage fraud, followed by 
title/escrow/settlement, and real estate investment). 
42 See Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru & James Witkin, Asset Quality Misrepresentation 
by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence From RMBS Market 3–4 (Columbia Bus. Sch., 
Working Paper No. 13-7, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2215422. 
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The FBI further identifies two categories of mortgage loan origination 
fraud: fraud for property and fraud for profit.43 The two are mainly distin-
guished by the purposes of the loan applicant, who would be the fraudster.44 
Fraud for property occurs when the misrepresentation and intent of the loan 
are motivated by the purchase of property as a primary residence.45 This is the 
garden-variety loan application lie, and usually only one loan is involved.46 
It is done to upgrade a lifestyle by getting a bigger loan than the bank would 
have otherwise authorized.47 Fraud for profit is a more nefarious and serious 
crime. It usually involves several loans and more elaborate schemes “perpe-
trated to gain illicit proceeds from property sales. Gross misrepresentations 
concerning appraisals and loan documents are common ... and participants 
are frequently paid for their participation.”48 Fraud for profit is fraud for 
property “on steroids.” 
Loan origination fraudsters use several elaborate schemes with equally 
elaborate names used to obtain funds from a mortgagee (the bank or mort-
gage originator). Occupancy fraud concerns a misrepresentation about how 
the property will be used.49 For example, the applicant might claim the prop-
erty will be a primary residence when it is really an investment property.50 
Or, the applicant may apply for a home intending for another to live there.51 
A builder bailout happens when a builder uses fraudulent schemes to rid 
himself of his inventory, such as secretly offering a buyer excessive incen-
tives like “‘no money down’” or “closing cost assistance” while concealing 
those incentives from the lender.52 “Buy and Bail” occurs when a buyer who 
already owns a home that has suffered a decrease in value, obtains a second 
mortgage while still current on the first with no intent of continuing to pay 
the first.53 Chunking happens when a third party acts as a borrower’s agent 
and uses the identity of an innocent borrower to apply and obtain many more 
                                                                                                                         
43 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT, supra note 40. 
44 See id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See id. 
48 Id. 
49 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, ADVISORY 
NO. FIN-2012-A009 1 (2012), http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2012 
-A009.pdf. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, THE DETECTION AND DETERRENCE OF 
MORTGAGE FRAUD AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A WHITE PAPER, 13 (2010) http:// 
www.ffiec.gov/exam/Mtg_Fraud_wp_Feb2010.pdf [hereinafter FFIEC WHITE PAPER] . 
53 Id. at 16. 
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loans than were agreed to by the borrower.54 This scheme usually requires 
assistance from an appraiser, broker, or title company representative to avoid 
having to bring money to multiple closings.55 A phantom sale occurs when 
an individual falsely transfers title to a property (for example a fictitious 
quit claim deed) and uses that as security to obtain a mortgage.56 
The schemes are constantly changing,57 but the goal is always the 
same: to “find someone who will let himself be deceived”58 and make off 
with the money. 
C. Mortgage Fraud Prosecuted Under Federal Law 
Although there is no specific federal law against mortgage fraud, there 
are several federal criminal laws that ensnare mortgage fraudsters. For ex-
ample, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 requires a mort-
gage applicant to make a statement to the federal government in the form of 
a HUD-1 Statement.59 The HUD-1 Statement brings the fraud within the 
scope of Title 18, U.S. Code, § 1001, which prohibits misrepresentation to 
the federal government.60 The Wire Fraud statute can also capture mortgage 
fraud.61 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud applies when fraud is used to 
obtain funds that are then wired across state lines from the lender’s bank to 
the closing agent’s bank.62 Similarly, mail fraud becomes available as a pros-
ecutorial weapon when misrepresentations are mailed to the bank under 18 
U.S.C. § 1341.63 Furthermore, depending on the scheme to defraud, criminal 
conspiracy charges often become a possibility, especially with straw buyer 
schemes and other large fraud-for-profit situations.64 
                                                                                                                         
54 Id. at 7. 
55 Id. at 18. 
56 Id. at 34. 
57 See Brady Dennis & Danielle Douglass, Mortgage Settlement Fuels New Scams, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2012, at A12 (statement of  Patrick Madigan, assistant Iowa 
Attorney General) (“[Mortgage Fraud schemes are] like a game of Whac-a-Mole .... You 
hit one and four more pop up.”).  
58 MACHIAVELLI, supra note 3, at 61. 
59 Philip J. Vacco, RESPA and Avoiding Mortgage Fraud: What Goes on the HUD 
Settlement Statement?, 96 ILL. B.J. 248, 250 (2008). 
60 Thomas N. Palermo, Going “Cocoanuts”: Looking at Modern Mortgage Fraud, 57 
FED. LAWYER 38, 39 (June 2010) (citing United States v. Wilkins, 308 F. App’x 920 (6th 
Cir. 2009), aff’g United States v. Wilkins, No. 1:06-CR-76-02, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20633 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 22, 2007)).  
61 Palermo, supra note 60, at 39; see Chris Olwell, $10 Million in Restitution Ordered 
in Mortgage Fraud, NEWS HERALD (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.newsherald.com/news 
/crime-public-safety/10-million-in-restitution-ordered-in-mortgage-fraud-1.86333.   
62 Palermo, supra note 60, at 39. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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Determining prison sentencing for mortgage fraud can be somewhat 
problematic, but, as shown below, it is less of a problem than when deter-
mining restitution awards. Because mortgages can change hands frequently, 
it can be difficult to satisfy the Sentencing Guidelines requirement that there 
be a victim at trial, sometimes it can simply be hard to determine who exactly 
that victim is.65 A sentence is determined mainly by the size of the loss 
caused by the fraud.66 This results in the somewhat odd consequence that 
similar criminal actions can receive different sentences depending on the 
health of the housing market. If the value of the housing market has appre-
ciated since the fraud, then the crime is punished less severely. 
After a bank discovers it is a victim of fraud and has taken ownership of 
the property but has not yet sold it, there is still not yet a clear loss for the 
purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. The home must be sold under the 
Sentencing Guidelines to determine the loss.67 Yet, in the grey area when the 
bank has yet to sell the property, the Sentencing Guidelines allow the court 
to “make a reasonable estimate of the loss” at the time of sentencing.68 For 
example, in a calculation to determine the loss from fraud a court might start 
with the value of the loan, which would be what the bank gave over to the 
fraudster, minus the fair market value of the home, as determined by an ap-
praiser at the time of sentencing.69 Regardless of whether there were market 
shifts between the fraud and the sentencing, courts rightly seem to attribute 
all losses in home value to the fraudsters.70 This can make sentencing rela-
tively harsh when housing prices fall and relatively lenient when prices 
rise.71 The calculation of loss under the Sentencing Guidelines does not 
establish loss for the purposes of criminal restitution.72 
Despite this uneven outcome resulting from unclear sentencing guide-
lines, putting a fraudster in jail does not directly benefit the lender, as the 
lender is likely to still be out a significant sum of money. As such, restitu-
tion can often help the lender recover funds in a more fruitful, direct way. 
II. RESTITUTION 
Restitution can be a difficult subject to discuss because the word has 
taken on many different meanings. “Restitution” can refer both to a cause of 
                                                                                                                         
65 Id. at 40 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. n.1 (2007) 
(defining a victim as any person who sustained any part of actual loss)).  
66 Id. 
67 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(C) (2007). 
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
70 See, e.g., United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 2012). 
71 Palermo, supra note 60, at 41 (“[A]s any practitioner involved in federal white-
collar prosecutions can tell you, cases without losses are not prosecuted frequently.”). 
72 See United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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action and a remedy.73 Even when considered as a remedy the word can be 
interpreted in different ways. Traditionally, restitution was a tool of equity 
courts that focused on fairness by attempting to undo wrongs.74 “Restitution” 
often refers to remedies based on unjust enrichment.75 Where, for example, 
a contract was entered in to by one of the parties with no intent to perform, 
an unjust enrichment remedy would attempt to return the consideration given 
by the wronged, performing party.76 In that situation, restitution is often ap-
propriate to return to the faithfully performing party what the lying party 
received. This is perhaps most often and best seen in the contract context. 
Restitutionary remedies in the civil context have traditionally focused on 
the defendant’s gain to determine what should be owed to the plaintiff.77 
Damages do just the opposite and focus on plaintiff’s loss. According to 
the Restatement of Restitution (Third), where a defendant is enriched by a 
money payment, as in a mortgage fraud situation, the measure of restitution 
should be “the resulting increase in the defendant’s net assets ....”78 In mort-
gage fraud, that would seem to amount to the exact value of the loan re-
ceived, or the amount received over and above the lower amount the 
fraudster would have received without any deception. While this type of 
language appears to fit the mortgage fraud situation, it is not the type of res-
titution at issue. Criminal restitution is entirely different. For the rest of this 
Note, “restitution” will be used to refer to the criminal context, in which, 
“restitution is not only a means of making a victim whole, but also serves 
punitive and rehabilitative purposes.”79 
A. Federal Criminal Restitution 
A federal court cannot order restitution unless authorized by statute.80 
Federal courts have only relatively recently been able to impose orders of 
restitution in a meaningful way.81 Congress has gradually made it clear 
that restitution should be a regular part of the sentencing process. 
                                                                                                                         
73 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (9th ed. 2009). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See Fed. Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 633 F.2d 978, 983 n.7 (1st Cir. 1980). 
77 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (9th ed. 2009). 
78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49(2); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1(b) (“Broadly speak-
ing, an ineffective transaction for these purposes is one that is nonconsensual.”). 
79 United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
80 United States v. Hicks, 997 F.2d 594, 600 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. 
Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1177 (2d Cir. 1989)) (“‘A federal court has no inherent power 
to order restitution.’”); United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1984); see also 
United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1391 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that restitution 
orders may only compensate for the kinds of harms enumerated in the statute). 
81 Catharine M. Goodwin, The Imposition of Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases, 
62 FED. PROBATION 95, 95 (1998) (“In fact, until 1982 restitution could not be imposed as a 
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The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA) is a milestone 
statute that gave federal courts the discretionary authority to order restitution 
“as a separate component of a federal criminal sentence.”82 It was passed “‘to 
address the unmet needs of crime victims.’”83 The Act’s existence owes much 
to the Victim’s Rights Movement. In 1972 that movement was accelerated 
by the controversial Supreme Court decision in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.84 
There, the Court decided that a mother of a child born out of wedlock did 
not have standing to enjoin the district attorney and force him to prosecute a 
“deadbeat dad” for violating a law requiring the payment of child support.85 
The case explained “that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the 
prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened 
with prosecution.... [I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen 
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of 
another.”86 In other words, a third-party citizen, even if a victim of the defen-
dant, is ignored by criminal prosecutions. Criminal actions are to be viewed 
as only concerning the state and the accused. The Court however did leave 
the door open to the possibility that such standing for a victim could be cre-
ated by statute.87 
Congress responded to this opportunity by passing the VWPA.88 Re-
porting the bill to the full Senate, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated:  
The principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually every formal 
system of criminal justice, of every culture and every time. It holds 
that, whatever else the sanctioning power of society does to punish its 
                                                                                                                         
separate component of a federal criminal sentence, but only as a condition of probation 
pursuant to the Federal Probation Act of 1925 (FPA).” (citation omitted)). 
82 Id.; Catherine M. Goodwin, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases: Summary 
Training Outline, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 3 (2001), http://www.ussc.gov/Education 
_and_Training/Online_Learning_Center/Supporting_Materials/Restitution-in-Federal-Crim 
inal-Cases.pdf.  
83 Alexander J. Sisemore, Note, Straying from the Written Path: How the Supreme 
Court Eviscerated the Plain Meaning of the MVRA’s Ninety-Day Deadline Provision and 
Legislated from the Bench in Dolan v. United States, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 211, 214 (2012) 
(quoting Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Restitution in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 77 
JUDICATURE 90, 90 (1993)). 
84 410 U.S. 614 (1973); History of Victims’ Rights, NAT’L CRIME VICTIMS LAW INST. 
(2011), available at http://law.lclark.edu/centers/national_crime_victim_law_institute/about 
_ncvli/history_of_victims_rights/ (“The legal impetus for the Modern Crime Victims’ Rights 
Movement was, in part, the 1973 United States Supreme Court decision in Linda R.S. v. 
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1972).”). 
85 410 U.S. at 619. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 617. 
88 S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2536. 
2014] MANDATORY VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT 291 
wrongdoers, it should also ensure that the wrongdoer is required to the de-
gree possible to restore the victim to his or her prior state of well-being.89 
The victim was gradually getting a voice in the criminal courtroom. 
In 1990, the Supreme Court concluded in Hughey v. United States that 
the VWPA authorized restitution for “loss caused [only] by the conduct 
underlying the offense of conviction establishes the outer limits of a resti-
tution order.”90 Shortly after the Hughey decision, Congress responded by 
amending the VWPA to include more specific offenses, but ostensibly 
agreed with the Supreme Court’s recent decision when it left unchanged 
the Hughey requirement that restitution must be tied to the offense charged 
and loss caused by the offense.91 
One exception to the causal connection required in Hughey between 
the loss recovered in restitution and the offense charged concerns “scheme, 
conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity....”92 Harm done through those 
activities does not need to be direct as is otherwise required.93 In the 1990s, 
Congress pushed for more restitution by taking discretion away from the 
courts.94 Congress first made restitution a requirement in certain instances 
with the Child Support Recovery Act in 1992.95 Next, Congress identified 
other specific crimes for restitution in 1994: violence against women, do-
mestic violence, sexual exploitation of children, sexual abuse, and tele-
marketing.96 Finally, in 1996, Congress overhauled the VWPA and created 
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA).97 
B. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) 
Through its actions in the 1990s, Congress demonstrated dissatisfac-
tion with the courts’ utilization of the discretionary restitution granted by 
the VWPA.98 During the passage of the MVRA, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee noted that “significant strides have been made since 1982 to-
ward a more victim-centered justice system, much progress remains to be 
                                                                                                                         
89 Id. 
90 495 U.S. 411, 420 (1990). 
91 Goodwin, Imposition of Restitution, supra note 81, at 95. 
92 Goodwin, Imposition of Restitution, supra note 81, at 98. 
93 Goodwin, Imposition of Restitution, supra note 81, at 99; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(a)(1)(A) 
(West 2013). 
94 Goodwin, Imposition of Restitution, supra note 81, at 95. 
95 Id. at 96. 
96 Goodwin, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases, supra note 82, at 3. 
97 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 201, 110 Stat. 
1214, 1227 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012)). 
98 See id. 
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made .... According to the 1994 Annual Report of the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission, during fiscal year 1994, Federal courts ordered restitution 
in only 20.2 percent of criminal cases.”99 The MVRA is more unyielding 
and rigid than the laws it replaced. The loose framework of the VWPA was 
erased with the new mandate requiring restitution for certain crimes.100 But 
at the same time, the new law “‘significantly limit[ed]’ a sentencing court’s 
discretion in determining the amount of restitution.”101 The MVRA limits the 
focus of criminal restitution to losses resulting from property damage or loss, 
bodily injury, and death.102 The MVRA also rendered the financial situation 
of the defendant irrelevant in the determination of the restitution amount, 
which previously could have been a mitigating factor.103 
1. Causation and Victim 
The MVRA contains a causation requirement by outlining how a victim 
is identified. It states that a “‘victim’ means a person directly and proxi-
mately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense....”104 This allows 
for restitution to be invoked “‘only for losses directly resulting from the 
defendant’s offense.’”105 This exception has been understood to mean that 
“Congress meant restitution to compensate the victim for his or her loss, and 
[the Supreme Court] explained that this was the reason ‘restitution is tied to 
the loss caused by the offense of conviction.’”106 The offense leading to the 
conviction “must have caused a loss for which a court may order restitution, 
but the loss cannot be too far removed from that conduct.”107 Some examples 
where a court found cause  are a police vehicle damaged in a chase after a 
                                                                                                                         
99 S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 13 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 926 
(breaking down crimes by percentage ordering restitution: “27.9 percent of all murders, 
28.2 percent of all kidnappings, 55.2 percent of all robberies, and 12.5 percent of all 
sexual-abuse cases.”). 
100 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act § 204. 
101 United States v. Martinez, 610 F.3d 1216, 1230 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United 
States v. Bright, 353 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004)); Heidi M. Grogan, Comment, 
Characterizing Criminal Restitution Pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act: 
Focus on the Third Circuit, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1079, 1079–80 (2005). 
102 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(A)(3)(b)(1)–(3) (West 2013). 
103 United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1997). 
104 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(a)(2) (West 2013). 
105 United States v. Morgan, 376 F.3d 1002, 1014 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United 
States v. Koenig, 952 F.2d 267, 275 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Kenney, 789 
F.2d 783, 784 (9th Cir.1986)). 
106 United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Hughey v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 411, 418 (1990)). 
107 United States v. Gamma Tech Indus., Inc., 265 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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robbery,108 a bystander shot by a police officer,109 and investigative and 
clean up costs from a Clean Air Act offense.110 
The MVRA’s causation requirement bars consequential damages.111 A 
person killed from an unlawfully sold handgun is not considered a causal 
victim in restitution with respect to the seller of the handgun.112 Any resti-
tution award must have a direct causal connection to the crime for which the 
defendant is convicted.113 In the mortgage lending situation, the bank be-
comes a victim when fraud causes a pecuniary loss.114 
The court should inquire into whether but-for the defendant’s lies the 
bank would have made the loan at all. If the loan would still have been 
made, but at a higher rate to compensate for the concealed risks, then the 
bank (victim) would only be entitled to the incremental profits from the in-
creased rate.115 The bank or lender would not be able to claim that but-for 
the fraud the loan would not have been made, therefore it would not be en-
titled to the amount of the loan in restitution. “Fraud for property” situations 
seem to be a more likely fit for this scenario than schemes for profit. The 
elaborate lies in “fraud for profit” schemes are likely so significant that the 
bank would have never made a loan. 
The MVRA mandates two specific exceptions from when restitution 
should not be awarded: when the number of victims is so large that payment 
                                                                                                                         
108 Catherine M. Goodwin, Handout: Key Restitution Cases, U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2 (June 2012), http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Annual_National 
_Training_Seminar/2012/2_Key_Restitution_Cases.pdf (citing U.S. v. Washington, 434 
F.3d 1265, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
109 Id. (citing United States v. Metzger, 233 F.3d 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
110 Id. (citing United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 846 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
111 See United States v. Morgan, 376 F.3d 1002, 1014 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering “opportunity cost” interest and finance 
charges in calculating its restitution order). 
112 Goodwin, Handout: Key Restitution Cases, supra note 108, at 5. 
113 United States v. Radi, 340 F. App’x 401, 403 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United 
States v. Baker, 25 F.3d 1452 (9th Cir. 1994)) (“[T]he district court is only authorized ‘to 
order restitution for the losses caused by the specific conduct underlying the offense of 
conviction.’”); United States v. Cutter, 313 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[R]estitution should 
not be ordered if the loss would have occurred regardless of the defendant’s misconduct 
underlying the offense of conviction. Second, restitution is inappropriate if the conduct 
underlying the conviction is too far removed, either factually or temporally, from the 
loss.”); see United States v. Nossan, 647 F.3d 822, 828 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming an 
order of restitution against a drug dealer for funeral expenses to be paid to the estate of a 
drug overdose victim). 
114 United States v. Yeung, 672 F.3d 594, 603 (9th Cir. 2012). 
115 United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 2007) (deciding a non-
mortgage loan, the court held “[t]hat fact was taken into account by the district court, which 
did not attribute the lending banks’ entire loss to the fraud. Instead, the district court properly 
focused only on the amount of loss attributable to the falsified Borrowing Certificates.”). 
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would be impracticable or when the calculation becomes too burdensome.116 
Both of these exceptions could be at play in the mortgage fraud arena because 
of how mortgages are involved in structured finance and the complications 
involved in calculating what the bank has lost because of the fraud, especially 
in the situation when the loan still would have been made. Defining a victim 
this way does not determine the amount of harm inflicted upon the victim. 
The MVRA includes other provisions to calculate what the fraudster owes.117 
2. Value of the Property 
Measuring the value of restitution requires precision: too little restitution 
awarded and the MVRA is not satisfied, because the victim is not made 
whole. But similarly, too high an award will overcompensate the victim. The 
Act does not allow the victim to obtain a windfall or double recovery.118 
The Act has a specific provision dealing with property damage.119 Where 
property is involved, the Act reads: 
(b) The order of restitution shall require that such defendant— 
(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction 
of property of a victim of the offense— 
(A) return the property to the owner of the property or someone desig-
nated by the owner; or 
(B) if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is impossible, im-
practicable, or inadequate, pay an amount equal to— 
(i) the greater of— 
(I) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruc-
tion; or 
(II) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less 
(ii) the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the 
property that is returned;120 
The court in U.S. v. Boccagna synthesizes the statute succinctly: 
Thus, the MVRA unambiguously tells a court what to value (the property 
lost; the property returned) and even when to value it (in the case of the 
                                                                                                                         
116 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 204, 110 Stat. 
1214, 1229 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012)); S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 
19 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 932 (“[I]t is the committee’s intent that 
highly complex issues related to the cause or amount of a victim’s loss not be resolved 
under the provisions of mandatory restitution.”). 
117 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act § 204. 
118 United States v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 566 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing United 
States v. Frazier, 651 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he MVRA does not allow victims 
to obtain double recovery or a windfall through restitution.”); United States v. Ruff, 420 
F.3d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 2005). 
119 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act § 204. 
120 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(3)(b)(1) (West 2013). 
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loss value, property is evaluated “on the date of the damage, loss, or de-
struction,” ... or “on the date of sentencing,” ... whichever is greater; in 
the case of offset value, property is evaluated “as of the date the property 
is returned,” ... The statute is silent, however, on the question of how 
the referenced property is to be valued.121 
Courts have thought of property in the banking situation as only the money 
begotten through fraud.122 However, to serve the purposes of the MVRA 
and fully compensate the victim, courts should not end the inquiry of what 
was stolen with the loan amount. 
The damaged property in the mortgage fraud situation is more than just 
the money stolen: the bank’s business has suffered. Capital is a crucial ingre-
dient in the business model of a bank.123 Money, or capital, is a key input for 
the bank to be productive; it’s analogous to factory machinery at an auto-
mobile plant or any other manufacturer. Accordingly, thinking of the loss in 
this way means that a victim should be entitled to the profits he would have 
made if he had used the machinery, as well as owned the machinery itself. 
The bank’s business operation was directly harmed when the defendant 
schemed to divert funds from their rightful place. In other words, the courts 
in their quest to make victims whole should be more willing to include the 
opportunities forgone because of the theft. 
This conception of property and the restitution award must conform to 
the requirements of actual loss to the victim caused by the offense charged.124 
The First Circuit has developed a two prong test to determine directness of 
losses: 
First: Restitution should not be ordered in respect to a loss which 
would have occurred regardless of the defendant’s conduct.... Second: 
Even if but for the causation is acceptable in theory, limitless but for 
causation is not. Restitution should not lie if the conduct underlying the 
                                                                                                                         
121 United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
122 United States v. James, 564 F.3d 1237, 1246 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Adams, 19 Fed. App’x 33, 35 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the MVRA is inapplicable 
because there was no pecuniary loss suffered when the defendant committed criminal copy-
right infringement because the stolen property was confiscated before it could be sold). 
123 See United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 955 (7th Cir. 2012) (rehearing and sugges-
tion for rehearing en banc denied Nov. 28, 2012) (“The property damaged by Robers’s fraud 
was capital and to recoup that capital, Fannie Mae and then MGIC had to incur numerous 
expenses to safeguard, keep up, and dispose of the collateral that secured the loan.”). 
124 U.S.C.A. § 3663A; United States v. Fair, 699 F.3d 508, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Fallon, 470 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Quillen, 335 F.3d 219, 222 (3d 
Cir. 2003)) (quoting Gov’t of V.I. v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41, 45 (3d Cir.1994)) (recognizing 
“that under the MVRA ‘restitution must be ... based upon losses directly resulting from 
[the defendant’s criminal] conduct.’”). 
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offense of conviction is too far removed, either factually or temporally, 
from the loss.125 
Alternatively, a restitution amount can be agreed to through a plea agree-
ment.126 
It is important to notice that this analysis neglects another victim of mort-
gage origination fraud: the applicant on the margin. This person either did not 
get a loan at all, or paid more for the loan, or was approved for a smaller loan. 
Although this victim is likely unidentifiable,127 she exists in theory. Even 
though lenders have immense financial resources, they are not unlimited, 
which means fraud necessarily takes away from those who are honest. These 
victims will likely never see restitution because they themselves have no real 
way to know that fraud has thwarted their loan application. 
The First Circuit explains that the “purpose of restitution is not to punish 
the defendant, but to make the victim whole again by restoring to it the value 
of the losses it suffered as a result of the defendant’s crime.... This is nec-
essarily a backward-looking inquiry that takes into account what actually 
happened....”128 
Viewing property in this way requires a consideration of the “opportunity 
cost” of the bank deciding to make a loan based on false information. Be-
cause of the fraud, the bank did not use investment Plan B. The fraudster 
stepped in and thwarted that. So the loss to the bank is the expected present 
discounted value of payments the bank would have received under its plan B. 
While this is not an example of contract damages, where the bank gets the 
benefit of the bargain in the mortgage agreement, the fraudster denies the 
bank the benefit of the bargain that it otherwise would have made. It is easy 
to imagine a scenario where a small bank, for example, is considering two 
investments: the fraudster’s mortgage loan and a stock purchase. If the 
stock goes “gangbusters,” should not the lender be entitled to the stock gains 
that it otherwise would have earned? In a sense, part of the property lost is the 
alternative investment. The focus must be entirely on the victim, and thus, 
not at all on what the defendant gained. 
                                                                                                                         
125 United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.3d 579, 589 (1st Cir. 1997). 
126 United States v. Thomas, 862 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 2012). 
127 United States v. Catoggio, 326 F.3d 323, 328 (2nd Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
district court did not commit plain error in holding that a racketeering defendant injured 
10,000 victims that were identifiable). 
128 See United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 293–94 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing United 
States v. Cornier-Ortiz, 361 F.3d 29, 42 (1st Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. 
Galloway, 509 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that criminal restitution cannot 
be based on defendant’s gain); United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that “[r]estitution must be based on the victim’s loss rather than the offender’s 
gain.”).  
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Many courts have held that damages under the MVRA should mirror 
what would happen in civil litigation.129 This seems incompatible with the 
MVRA. A civil litigation action in the mortgage fraud context would likely 
be based on unjust enrichment, which necessarily focuses on what the defen-
dant improperly acquired.130 This is directly counter to the MVRA’s allow-
ance that stolen property be returned to the victim.131 It does not say that 
profits or gains from the stolen property should be disgorged from the defen-
dant, which is a real possibility in an equitable restitution action. Also, the 
other remedies likely available for mortgage fraud in civil litigation could be 
held in an equitable lien, constructive trust, or rescission. It may be helpful 
to think of criminal restitution in this context as similar to the rescission of 
a contract, restoring the parties back to where they were before the loan.132 
3. Offset 
The MVRA requires that the victim’s judgment be reduced by any part of 
the property that is returned.133 Without accounting for property returned, 
the victim would recover more in damages than was caused by the fraud. Cir-
cuits disagree on how to account for the property returned.134 The sequence 
of events would unfold as follows: the fraudster defaults on the home reveal-
ing the fraud, the bank then has the right to take possession and sell the prop-
erty under the mortgage agreement.135 These two actions taken by the bank, 
                                                                                                                         
129 E.g., United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1052, 1054 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
recovery to which [the victim] would have been entitled in a civil suit against the crim-
inal.... Congress required judges to include this remedy in a criminal judgment to avoid the 
need for the victims of crime to file separate civil suits litigation that, given the preclusive 
effect of the criminal judgment, would have an inevitable outcome. A civil remedy included 
with a criminal judgment does not make it a penalty for a crime that must be established be-
yond a reasonable doubt; otherwise it would not be possible to apply the law of preclusion 
(or grant summary judgment) in an ordinary civil suit seeking restitution.”); United States 
v. Martin, 195 F.3d 961, 968 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that “the [MVRA] seeks to engraft a 
civil remedy onto a criminal statute, giving the victim of the crime the recovery to which he 
would have been entitled in a civil suit against the criminal....”). 
130 Grogan, supra note 101, at 1079. 
131 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(b)(1)(A) (West 2013). 
132 See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks & Alexander Stremitzer, Beyond Ex Post 
Expediency—An Ex Ante View of Rescission and Resitituion, 68 WASH & LEE L. REV. 
1171 (2011).  
133 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(b)(1)(B) (West 2013). 
134 Compare United States v. Holley, 23 F.3d 902, 915 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
property is returned when it is deeded back to a financial institution), with United States 
v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 953 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the value of a property is 
returned according to the amount recouped when it is sold). 
135 See supra Part I.A. 
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taking possession and then selling, are the fault lines between the circuit 
courts in determining when the property has actually been returned to the 
lender. Foreclosure is another word for executing on the security interest.136 
Consider the non-fraudulent foreclosure situation. Foreclosure can take many 
forms. One form is the judicial sale, conducted by the court.137 Another 
older way is strict foreclosure.138 “The prevailing procedure of strict fore-
closure simply terminated the debtor’s redemption period and vested title in 
the mortgagee. The mortgagee thus obtained the benefit of the property’s 
value over the debt amount. The English equity courts began to require fore-
closure by sale to prevent this inequity.”139 In today’s standard foreclosure 
proceedings, the borrower’s indebtedness “is reduced by the foreclosure sale 
proceeds, less costs of sale.”140 “Depressed value on the sale date and higher 
value at a prior or subsequent date are not judicially cognizable” in the fore-
closure setting.141 And furthermore, foreclosure sales generally do not reflect 
the full value of the property.142 
In the criminal restitution context, the valuation of the property is more 
complicated than in the normal foreclosure setting. Some courts hold that 
the value of the property is reduced or offset when the bank takes possession 
of the real estate collateral.143 The Ninth Circuit has held the exact opposite 
in a non-mortgage situation where revolving credit was obtained and secured 
by collateral.144 However, another set of circuits held that the bank’s damages 
are only offset when money is received from the sale of the real property.145 
                                                                                                                         
136 See Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price 
Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 845 (1980). 
137 See id. at 846.  
138 E.g., id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 846 (“[D]eficiency judgments are generally based automatically on the sale 
price.”); id. at 858 (“The court’s inquiry into the adequacy of the foreclosure sale price is 
limited by two well-established principles: valuation of foreclosed property occurs at the 
date of the foreclosure sale, and the sale price is conclusive of the property’s value.”). 
141 Id. at 858. 
142 See id. at 848. 
143 E.g., United States v. Yeung, 672 F.3d 594, 605 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
value of the property should be measured from the date that the title was assigned to the 
bank, not from the later date of the property’s sale); United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 
107, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding the case to determine the fair market value at the 
time of title transfer); United States v. Holley, 23 F.3d 902, 915 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that when a home is deeded back to a financial institution, the value of the home acts as a 
“partial return”). 
144 See United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d 1080, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming the 
district court’s decision to “[discount] by the percentage the lending banks recovered 
when they foreclosed on Craig Electronics’ collateral.”). 
145 United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 955 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the value 
of the property returned is the value of the amount of money recovered at the property’s 
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When the property is considered as it is in the Ninth Circuit, it is clear that 
the bank getting the home is not the property that was stolen.146 
III. PROPERTY AS NOT ONLY THE LOAN, BUT ALSO AS OPPORTUNITY COST  
After a victim has been identified, losses suffered must be proven to 
have been a result of the offense.147 The government must prove a victim’s 
loss under a preponderance of the evidence standard.148 Congress advised the 
courts that calculating restitution under the MVRA should not be an arduous 
process.149 Viewing property as suggested in this Note above may render a 
restitution calculation very complex. However, there are calculation rules 
created by the courts that will simplify and expedite the process. First, the 
court may resolve any uncertainty in favor of the victim.150 Also, “absolute 
precision is not required.”151 The calculation can only be based on actual 
loss,152 without reference to a defendant’s gain.153 
                                                                                                                         
sale); United States v. Statman, 604 F.3d 529, 538 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
district court did not err when they used the foreclosure sale price to measure restitution 
rather than the assessed value of the property); United States v. James, 564 F.3d 1237, 
1246 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court did not err in measuring restitution 
by the amount of the foreclosure sale, minus the mortgage amount); United States v. 
Himler, 355 F.3d 735, 745 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court did not err in 
determining restitution at a set amount, minus the amount of the future recoupment from 
the sale of the property). 
146 See Robers, 698 F.3d at 942 (“Under the plain language of the statute, what 
matters is when at least part of the cash was returned to the victims—not when the vic-
tims received title to the houses securing the loans. And the cash was returned to the vic-
tims only when the collateral houses securing the loans were eventually resold.”); James, 
564 F.3d at 1238 (“[T]he foreclosure sale amount more accurately measured mortgage 
holder’s loss.”). 
147 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(e) (West 2013). 
148 Id. 
149 S. REP. NO. 104-179, supra note 99, at 19 (“In all cases, it is the committee’s intent that 
highly complex issues related to the cause or amount of a victim’s loss not be resolved under 
the provisions of mandatory restitution. The committee believes that losses in which the 
amount of the victim’s losses are speculative, or in which the victim’s loss is not clearly 
causally linked to the offense, should not be subject to mandatory restitution.”). 
150 E.g., United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d 1080, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United 
States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) (“To achieve the goal of making crime 
victims whole, the MVRA permits ‘district courts to engage in an expedient and reasonable 
restitution process, with uncertainties resolved with a view toward achieving fairness to 
the victim.’”). 
151 United States v. Burdi, 414 F.3d 216, 221 (1st Cir. 2005). 
152 E.g., United States v. Reynolds, 432 F.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
restitution may only be granted based on actual loss). 
153 E.g., United States v. Galloway, 509 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that criminal restitution cannot be based on defendant’s gain); United States v. George, 403 
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The Tenth Circuit has held that restitution under the MVRA cannot be 
based upon speculation.154 In one case, a defendant was convicted of exca-
vating property in violation of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act 
(ARPA). The appeals court held that restitution based on what a hypothetical 
dig would have cost the government would be speculative, and not based on 
the victim’s actual loss.155 
The conception of property that this Note proposes is not speculative. It 
starts with the assumption that, without any other evidence, the stolen cap-
ital would have earned a market rate of return. This is the same as when res-
titution for stolen lobsters was calculated simply by multiplying the number 
of lobsters stolen by the market price at the time they were stolen.156 How-
ever, when there is additional evidence pointing to an alternative investment 
that would have been made with sufficient certainty, then it would not be 
speculative to give up the value of the investment that would have occurred 
up to the date of judgment. For example, if a small bank was considering 
loaning the fraudster money or investing in Apple stock, then the bank 
should be able to realize the return from the investment in Apple stock that 
it would have made. 
The aspects that may be deemed to be speculative are whether the vic-
tim would have indeed made the investment and when the investment gains 
would have been realized. However, with enough evidence a prosecutor may 
be able to convince the court that any speculation would be no greater than in 
any other situation, since “any disputes concerning the amount of loss are to 
be resolved by the court by a preponderance of the evidence.”157 The burden 
“of demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of 
the offense shall be on the attorney for the Government.”158 After all, neither 
lost wages nor future lost wages are considered consequential damages.159 
Return on a specific investment that was thwarted does not seem much 
                                                                                                                         
F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that “[r]estitution must be based on the victim’s 
loss rather than the offender’s gain”).  
154 See United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 680 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
restitution must be based on actual loss and not speculative loss). 
155 Id. 
156 See United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2011). 
157 Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 681 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (2002)). 
158 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(e) (West 2013). 
159 See United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that speculative losses are incompatible with the MVRA); United States v. Atl. States Cast 
Iron Pipe Co., 612 F. Supp. 2d 453, 486 (D.N.J. 2009) (holding that in no case should the 
prospect of insurance compensation or other possible compensation be considered when 
determining restitution). But see Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994, 1001 (8th Cir. 
1999) (awarding restitution to a bank customer who suffered lost wages as a result of 
witnessing an attempted bank robbery).  
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more speculative than those situations. Whether the alternative investment 
would have been made should be an evidentiary question. 
Courts have been reluctant to wade into speculative waters. For example, 
in United States v. Chalupnik, a defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor 
copyright infringement.160 The victim was in the business of selling DVDs 
and CDs by mail.161 The victim arranged with the post office that undeliver-
able discs should simply be thrown away, since it was cheaper for the victim 
to manufacture another disc rather than to reship and restock an undelivered 
one.162 The defendant, a janitor at the post office, took the undelivered, dis-
carded discs from the post office trash and sold them at used record stores.163 
The District Court ordered two years probation and restitution equal to his 
documented sales, which equaled $78,818.164 The District Court reasoned 
that restitution was awarded because the defendant had deprived the victim 
of “the option of returning the CD’s to the market or destroying them.”165 
The Eighth Circuit held that the government did not prove any actual loss, 
“proof of lost sales, like proof of lost profits, may not be ‘based entirely upon 
speculation.’”166 The restitution award was vacated.167 While the District 
Court’s restitution award may have been appropriate under the equitable 
conception of restitution, the MVRA requires that restitution be based on 
the victim’s loss, not the defendant’s gain.168 
A similar case, United States v. Hudson, involved counterfeit Microsoft 
software.169 The Tenth Circuit vacated a restitution award that the District 
Court based on loss of a sale “that Microsoft would have made ... had Defen-
dant not sold ... counterfeit Microsoft products.”170 The Tenth Circuit found 
no support for the contention that the defendant thwarted a future sale, and 
was unable to see how the restitution award was anything but a windfall 
for Microsoft.”171 
The mortgage situation can be distinguished from the Hudson and 
Chalupnik cases because a financial firm will be able to provide more 
documentary evidence than in either of the above situations. The courts in 
                                                                                                                         
160 United States v. Chalupnik, 514 F.3d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 2008). 
161 Id. at 750. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 751. 
166 Id. at 755 (quoting United States v. Young, 272 F.3d 1052, 1056 (8th Cir. 2001)). 
167 Id. at 750. 
168 Id. at 754. 
169 483 F.3d 707, 708 (10th Cir. 2007). 
170 Id. at 710. 
171 Id. 
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each of those cases focused on a lack of provable loss.172 Banks are more 
likely to be able to provide the necessary documentation. 
A. Procedure 
The “procedure for issuance and enforcement” for a criminal restitution 
award is established in 18 U.S.C. § 3664.173 The procedure entitles the victim 
to a lien on a defendant’s property, as would occur in a civil matter.174 If the 
restitution determination becomes difficult, the court has the option to “refer 
any issue arising in connection with a proposed order of restitution to a mag-
istrate judge or special master for proposed findings of fact and recommen-
dations as to disposition, subject to a de novo determination of the issue by 
the court.”175 The government only needs to prove restitution damages by 
presenting a preponderance of the evidence.176 The court also, within its 
discretion, may determine whether the restitution payment should be made 
in installments or in one lump-sum.177 
Courts have found it wise to identify victims even if there is little like-
lihood that they will be repaid with a restitution award because 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3664(d)(5) allows a victim to recover in the event that a defendant “unex-
pectedly inherit[s] money, win[s] the lottery, or otherwise strike[s] it rich.”178 
The statute entitles the victim to a court order of full restitution regardless of 
the defendant’s financial circumstances.179 
B. Consequential Damages Are Barred 
Consequential damages are barred under the MVRA.180 Consequential 
damages as understood by the common law, are “losses ‘beyond those which 
naturally and directly flow’ from the defendant’s conduct.”181 A Second 
Circuit case has held that it was not plain error for the trial court to award 
restitution for taxes and foreclosure expenses.182 
                                                                                                                         
172 Chalupnik, 514 F.3d at 750; Hudson, 483 F.3d at 708. 
173 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664 (West 2013).  
174 § 3664(d)(2)(A)(v). 
175 § 3664(d)(6) (emphasis added). 
176 § 3664(e). 
177 § 3664(f)(3)(A). 
178 United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1999). 
179 § 3664(f)(1)(A). 
180 Supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text. 
181 United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting 
United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
182 Boccagna, 450 F.3d at 120. 
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However, if the defendant is convicted of conspiracy, scheme or pattern 
of criminal activity, an award of restitution under the MVRA may include 
losses for acts of related conduct for which the defendant was not convicted.183 
Conspiracy opens the door to restitution beyond the convicted crime. 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A potential criticism of offsetting the defendant’s liability to the victim 
by requiring the victim to sell collateral property is that it does not incentiv-
ize efficient sale of property. The same criticism applies in the foreclosure 
context: offsetting the bank’s loss at the time of sale encourages the bank to 
sell the house quickly, at a fire sale price to get the remainder of its principal 
in a judgment against the defendant.184 Similarly, a fire sale price can harm 
all other residents in the neighborhood in the form of decreased property 
values. The defendant is likely going to jail, rendering repayment in the short-
term extremely unlikely. The bank knows this, and prefers a higher sale price 
over increased jail time for the fraudster. 
In the mortgage fraud context, the offset rule only matters in a practical 
sense when the value of the home changes between the bank’s receipt of 
ownership and the sale price. Saddling the bank with the decrease in value 
of the home does not capture the entire loss caused by the defendant. If the 
price of the home increases between receipt and sale, the offset could cover 
the entire principal loan. The criminal would still be liable for lost profits, 
but his liability is decreased, just as it would be in the normal default situa-
tion. The criminal restitution then is somewhat subject to the vagaries of the 
market. The offset at receipt rule does not decrease this impact, but instead 
changes when valuation in the market is made. 
There is the clear policy implication that including the opportunity cost 
of the bank in the stolen property value would in theory make it more costly 
to engage in mortgage fraud. However, there may not be much of a deterrent 
effect, as mortgage fraudsters will unlikely ever possess the funds necessary 
to make their victims whole under either view of property. 
CONCLUSION 
Mortgage fraud has a long history. The way banks do business today has 
changed how criminals conduct mortgage fraud. Restitution has only rela-
tively recently been applied to mortgage fraud situations. The Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act requires the criminal to pay what the victim has 
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lost. Congress has made it clear that victims are to be given more consid-
eration by federal courts than in previous cases. 
The criminal restitution action is not brought by the victim, but by the 
government prosecutor. In the mortgage fraud context, courts have been split 
on how to account for the home returned to the bank; is it valued at the date 
of sale or when the bank takes possession? In the non-fraud context, the 
home is valued as the equivalent of the price received by the bank. In the 
restitution context under the MVRA, the home should also be valued when 
the bank sells it. 
The MVRA defines a victim as someone who is directly harmed by the 
commission of a criminal offense.185 As this Note argues, courts must rec-
ognize that property stolen in mortgage fraud is not limited to just the loan. 
The bank has also lost an investment opportunity it would have made had it 
not been for the fraud. Accordingly, a fraudster should restore to the bank 
the profits it would have earned from the alternative investment. 
Determining the victim and calculating restitution, while similar in analy-
sis, should be kept distinct. The victim is simply someone who is directly 
and proximately harmed by the convicted criminal conduct. Calculating res-
titution under the MVRA is specifically outlined in the text and requires 
determining the “property lost.” It then requires any property given back to 
the victim is to be valued on the date it is returned. Viewing the property 
this way is in line with the Seventh Circuit’s admonition that the word 
“property” must hold the same meaning throughout the statute.186 
The bar of speculative damages is a real risk to implementing this con-
cept of what is stolen. But, the bank must still prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, all it would have gained without the fraud. 
 
Arthur Durst* 
                                                                                                                         
185 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(2) (West 2013). 
186 See United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied en 
banc (Nov. 28, 2012). 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, William & Mary Law School; B.A., 2008, University of 
Virginia. The author would like to thank the helpful and generous professors of William 
and Mary and the BLR members that have provided helpful comments and support 
throughout the production of this Note. The author would also all like to express his 
gratitude to his family and friends for their constant love and support.  
